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¿Existe discrecionalidad en la decisión judicial?

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Author(s): García Amado, Juan Antonio

Journal: Isegoría
ISSN 1130-2097

Issue: 35;
Start page: 151;
Date: 2006;
Original page

Keywords: Judicial decision | legal positivism | discretionality | Decisión judicial | positivismo jurídico | discrecionalidad

ABSTRACT
Two different sets of legal theories have denied that judges have any discretion when deciding cases. The first was “naive” formalism as practised in the XIXth century,and more specifically, the exegesis school in France and the conceptual jurisprudence school (Begriffsjurisprudenz) in Germany. The second was the “sophisticated” formalism of the late XXth century, which both establishes a connection between law and social morality, and undertakes a moral reading of the constitution so that positive law could offer the one right answer in each case. On its turn, mainstream legal positivism has regarded judicial discretion as an unavoidable and even perhaps desirable consequence of the structural features of any really existing legal order.Dos tipos de doctrinas jurídicas han tratado de negar la discrecionalidad judicial: por un lado, el formalismo ingenuo del siglo XIX, propio de la Escuela de la Exégesis, en Francia, y de la Jurisprudencia de Conceptos, en Alemania; por otro lado, el formalismo sofisticado de fines del siglo XX, que primero integra derecho y moral social y, después, moraliza la Constitución positiva para que en el derecho positivo se contenga una única solución correcta para cada caso posible. Por contra, el positivismo jurídico del siglo XX ha visto en la discrecionalidad judicial una consecuencia, tan inevitable como conveniente, de los caracteres de todo sistema jurídico real.
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