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Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy

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Author(s): Jonathan M. Weinberg | Stephen J. Crowley

Journal: Studia Philosophica Estonica
ISSN 1406-0000

Volume: 2.2;
Start page: 177;
Date: 2009;
Original page

Keywords: experimental philosophy | armchair philosophy | intuitions | constitutivity | semantics | conceptual analysis

ABSTRACT
Standard philosophical methodology which proceeds by appeal to intuitions accessible "from the armchair" has come under criticism on the basis of empirical work indicating unanticipated variability of such intuitions. Loose constitutivity---the idea that intuitions are partly, but not strictly, constitutive of the concepts that appear in them---offers an interesting line of response to this empirical challenge. On a loose constitutivist view, it is unlikely that our intuitions are incorrect across the board, since they partly fix the facts in question. But we argue that this ratification of intuitions is at best rough and generic, and can only do the required methodological work if it operates in conjunction with some sort of further criteria of theory selection. We consider two that we find in the literature: naturalness (Brian Weatherson, borrowing from Lewis) and charity (Henry Jackman, borrowing from Davidson). At the end of the day, neither provides the armchair philosopher complete shelter from extra-armchair inquiry.
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