Author(s): Ron Naiweld
Journal: Yod : Revue des Études Hébraïques et Juives
ISSN 0338-9316
Issue: 15;
Start page: 13;
Date: 2011;
Original page
Keywords: submission | authority of God | commitment | Commandments – practice | Leibowitz Yeshayahou (1903-1994) | rabbinic Judaism | deed and truth | rabbinic subjectivation | moral law | christian subjectivation | reason | good and evil | Torah | Talmud | midrash | commandments of God | soumission | autorité de Dieu | commandements – pratique | Leibowitz Yeshayahou (1903-1994) | judaïsme rabbinique | action et vérité | subjectivation rabbinique | loi morale | subjectivation chrétienne | raison | bien et mal | Torah | Talmud | midrash | commandements de Dieu; engagement | מדרש | הגשה | סמכותו של אלוהים | מצוות האל | מחויבות | יהדות רבנית | מעשה ואמת | חוק המוסרי | טעם | טוב ורע | תורה | תלמוד
ABSTRACT
One of the main characteristics of rabbinic ethics is that it does not presuppose that a perfect knowledge of the truth is necessary to the practice of good. In this it differs from other ethical discourses, Christian or philosophical, of the Greco-Roman world. By studying this particularity of the rabbinical ethics, the present article tries to answer the following question: If knowledge of the “truth” does not lead to the practice of the “good”, how does rabbinic discourse articulates a motivation of the application of the law on an individual level?
Journal: Yod : Revue des Études Hébraïques et Juives
ISSN 0338-9316
Issue: 15;
Start page: 13;
Date: 2011;
Original page
Keywords: submission | authority of God | commitment | Commandments – practice | Leibowitz Yeshayahou (1903-1994) | rabbinic Judaism | deed and truth | rabbinic subjectivation | moral law | christian subjectivation | reason | good and evil | Torah | Talmud | midrash | commandments of God | soumission | autorité de Dieu | commandements – pratique | Leibowitz Yeshayahou (1903-1994) | judaïsme rabbinique | action et vérité | subjectivation rabbinique | loi morale | subjectivation chrétienne | raison | bien et mal | Torah | Talmud | midrash | commandements de Dieu; engagement | מדרש | הגשה | סמכותו של אלוהים | מצוות האל | מחויבות | יהדות רבנית | מעשה ואמת | חוק המוסרי | טעם | טוב ורע | תורה | תלמוד
ABSTRACT
One of the main characteristics of rabbinic ethics is that it does not presuppose that a perfect knowledge of the truth is necessary to the practice of good. In this it differs from other ethical discourses, Christian or philosophical, of the Greco-Roman world. By studying this particularity of the rabbinical ethics, the present article tries to answer the following question: If knowledge of the “truth” does not lead to the practice of the “good”, how does rabbinic discourse articulates a motivation of the application of the law on an individual level?
