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Disclosure of Medical Information in Health Insurance

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Author(s): Ilya Rahkovsky

Journal: Advances in Management and Applied Economics
ISSN 1792-7544

Volume: 3;
Issue: 1;
Start page: 183;
Date: 2013;
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Keywords: health insurance | disclosure | information | screening

ABSTRACT
Disclosure of private medical information allows insurance companies to better predict medical expenditures. The premiums the companies charge the insured employees reflect these expenditures. This paper studies incentives of employees to disclose their medical information. I find that healthier employees prefer to disclose medical information that results in a disclosure plan having a lower premium than a non disclosure plan. Furthermore, I find that if health plans have few employees and the employee turnover rate is high, it makes the incentive to disclose (or conceal) information stronger and the sorting of employees according to their health status more pronounced.
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