Author(s): Dean Rickles
Journal: Annales Philosophici
ISSN 2067-3159
Volume: 1;
Issue: 1;
Start page: 73;
Date: 2010;
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Keywords: nothingness | compositionality | subtraction argument
ABSTRACT
Given that worlds are defined compositionally as maximally spatiotemporally interrelated sums of possible objects, or as recombinations of actual states of affairs: what of empty worlds? It seems that such theories cannot admit such worlds, for nothing cannot come from the fusion or recombination of something. This is generally supposed to rule out metaphysical nihilism, the claim that there might have been nothing. In this brief note, I argue that the two positions can be made compatible by modifying the relationship between possibilities and possible worlds.
Journal: Annales Philosophici
ISSN 2067-3159
Volume: 1;
Issue: 1;
Start page: 73;
Date: 2010;
VIEW PDF
DOWNLOAD PDF Original pageKeywords: nothingness | compositionality | subtraction argument
ABSTRACT
Given that worlds are defined compositionally as maximally spatiotemporally interrelated sums of possible objects, or as recombinations of actual states of affairs: what of empty worlds? It seems that such theories cannot admit such worlds, for nothing cannot come from the fusion or recombination of something. This is generally supposed to rule out metaphysical nihilism, the claim that there might have been nothing. In this brief note, I argue that the two positions can be made compatible by modifying the relationship between possibilities and possible worlds.
