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OPTIMAL CONTRACTS OF THE MAIN-AGENT MODEL IN CONDITIONS OF SYMMETRIC INFORMATION

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Author(s): Tudor Colomeischi

Journal: Economics and Finance Review
ISSN 2047-0401

Volume: 1;
Issue: 6;
Start page: 60;
Date: 2011;
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Keywords: symmetric information | Principal-Agent model | optimal contracts | optimal salary | optimal effort level

ABSTRACT
This paper draws up an approach over the Main Agent model, in conditions of information symmetry. At the beginning, the Main Agent model is emphasized in a general way, mentioning the main contributions brought in time on its development, its characteristics and the basic principles. Then, the hypothesis of the general model isillustrated, drawing a conclusion as regards the model’s situations: Main neutral and Agent with risk aversion, Agent neutral and Main with risk aversion, and both partners having risk aversion.
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